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JOHN BRATLAND*

Economic Exchange as the Requisite
Basis for Royalty Ownership of Value
Added in Natural-Gas Sales
ABSTRACT
Gas royalties allow the lessor to capture economic rent (a surplus
above all production costs) and to share "risk" with the lessee.
However, the lessor owns no economic rent but owns only a
percentage of the sales value of the producedgas. The lessor, as a
royalty owner, comes into ownership of value added beyond the
wellhead only through some explicit or implicitact of exchange. An
actof exchangemay take theform ofdeductionsfor post-production
marketing costs or an actual sharingof such costs. But the implied
marketing covenant mandates royaltieson the value added with no
cost deductions or sharingoflessee's marketingcosts. Without acts
of exchange accomplished through a sharing of marketing costs,
royalties on value added are a breach of property rights and a
disincentive to efficient exploration, development, recovery, and
marketing of naturalgas.
I. THE ISSUE
Gas royalties provide the lessor with an instrument for capturing
economic rent and with a means of sharing economic uncertainty and
geologic risk with the lessee.1 The lessor (or royalty owner), however, has

* John Brtland is a Ph.D. economist with the U.S. Department of the Interior. Views
expressed are strictly those of the author. The author thanks Ms. Feliz A. Rael of the Editorial

Board of the NATURAL REsouRcEs JOURNAL for thoughtful suggestions and comments on the
article.
1. While economists frequently conflate risk and uncertainty, the concepts are distinct;
in the context of petroleum economics, "risk" can be applied to the quantifiable probabilities
associated with discovery, for example. "Uncertainty" is properly applied to the subjective

inferences regarding the future of the market; while the economics profession has struggled
to deny the fact, these subjective inferences are not amenable to the use of probabilities in the
quantitative sense. FRANK H1 KNIGHT, RISK, UNcUTAINw AND PRoFrr 19-20 (1964). On the
inherent subjectivity of market uncertainty as it is addressed in decision making, see generally

Roman Frydman, Touardan UnderstandingofMarket Processes:IndividualExpectations, Learning,
and Convergence to Rational Expectations Equilibrium, 72 AM. ECON. REv. 652 (1982). See also
LUDWIG VON MisEs, HUMAN ACION: ATREATISE ON ECONOMICS (THE SCHOLAR'S EDMON) 10518(1998).
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no ownership claim to economic rent or to the value of the in situ gas.'
Rather, the lessor owns and has a right to collect a royalty from the lessee
in the form of a fixed percentage of the market value of the gas produced
from the lease. The lessor's ability to collect royalty payments is possible
because, in principle, the lessor is capturing a surplus value (economic rent)
over and above all opportunity costs borne by the lessee in producing the
natural gas.3 But if the lessor's percentage royalty is designed to collect
economic rent, one may well ask, What portion of the gas sales proceeds
from any given period is economic rent? Of course, there is no empirical
answer that can be given to this question.4 This lack of measurability is one
of the principal reasons that the concept of economic rent is not considered
under royalty law even though the linkage between economic rent and
royalties has a critical bearing on the economic management of the lease.5
Nonetheless, the lessor's enforceable royalty-ownership claims traditionally
have absolutely nothing to do with the issue of economic rent or its
existence. While there is general agreement that the lessor owns only the

2. The nature of the lessor's claim "affirms that royalty in itself does not include a
perpetual interest of oil and gas inthe ground. A reservation of royalty is not a reservation of
fee ownership. Royalty is a distinctestate." JOAN BuRK,PEMROLEUM LANDS ANDLEASING 15 (1983)
(emphasis added).
3. From an accounting perspective, economic rent can be defined as gross receipts from
sales of production minus the sum of (1) operating expenses, (2) depreciation charges on
invested capital, and (3) a competitive return on invested capital. See Mason Gaffney, The
Objectives of GovernmentPolicy in Leasing MineralLands, in MINERAL LEASING AS AN INSTRUMENT
OF PUBLIc POLICY 3, 20 (Michael Crommelin & Andrew R. Thompson eds., British Columbia
Inst. for Econ. Policy Analysis, Econ. Conf. Pub. No. 5,1977). The sum of the three items listed
by Gaffney are intended to be an objective calibration of the opportunity costs for all of the
inputs employed in the production of the resource. For a lessee making decisions in uncertain
markets, however, the actual valuation of opportunity cost will involve subjective judgment
on the part of the lessee. Hence, at any particular moment in time, true economic rent becomes
an essentially subjective, unmeasurable magnitude.
4. Since economic rent cannot be objectively allocated or quantitatively pro-rated to
particular time periods, any attempt to discern this portion of the gas-sales value would be a
futile and meaningless exercise. Moreover, the total rent generated over the entire production
horizon depends upon the timing of gas production with respect to changes in the gas market.
See Stephen McDonald, PercentageDepletion, Expensing ofIntangiblesandPetroleumConservation,
in EXTRACTIVE RSOURCES ANDTAXATION 269,272 (Mason Gaffney ed., 1967). Hence, a prudently
establishedpercentage royalty can only approximate the captureof economic rent. During the entire
period that the lease is in production, the percentage royalties from sales proceeds may result
in collection of income that is either less than or greater than the total economic rent ultimately
realized over the entire history of production. The situation is complicated even further by the
fact that the temporal allocation of production costs such as depreciation charges will tend to
be subjective and contingent on the lessee's conjectures and attitudes about market uncertainty.
See Ronald H. Coase, Business Organizationand the Accountant, in L.S.E. EssAYS ON Cer95,114,
118 (James M. Buchanan & G. F. Thirlby eds., 1981). See also VON MISES,supra note 1,at 346.
5. The efficiency implications of this latter linkage are examined infra Part V.
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royalty percentage of the market value of the produced gas, there is much
less agreement as to what gas-sales proceeds are royalty bearing.6 Some of
the proceeds from any sale of gas will include value at the point of
production plus a remaining portion that represents value added from
transportation, processing, or marketing. Hence, one is confronted with
persistent questions. What principles of ownership determine the portion
of the gas-sales proceeds that can be properly viewed as "royalty bearing"?
In other words, how is production defined? How is value added defined,
and by what legitimate means does a portion of it become the property of
the royalty owner? Can the lessor's ownership of value added be
established by judicial decree? The article pursues these issues with
particular focus on the latter two questions as they arise in connection with
post-production value added from marketing. Unfortunately, the
application of gas-royalty law has not given consistent or even coherent
answers to these questions.
The above questions have been a source of dispute and litigation
between lessees and lessors from the earliest days of the petroleum
industry. However, the principal focus of this article is the contemporary
interpretation of the "implied covenant to market" in which the lessee is not
only implicitly obligated to market the produced gas but also to do so at no
cost to the royalty owner. The royalty owner is able to collect a royalty on
an increment in the value of the gas without having borne any cost of
creating this increment in value. This source of dispute seems to have been
aggravated by the fact that, more recently, gas sales typically occur at points
far removed from the wellhead. Moreover, at the time that the gas is sold,
it is frequently in a substantially altered condition compared to the
substance initially produced at the wellhead. These varying possible
circumstances surrounding the sale of the gas have provided ample
opportunity for disagreement and litigation. But virtually everything that
happens to the gas beyond the wellhead enhances its value whether or not
the natural gas is physically altered. To paraphrase the question posed
above, does the royalty owner have an ownership claim to any portion of
this enhancement in value? If so, how is this ownership established? The

6. HOWARDR. WILAMS &CHARLESJ. Mv , OIL ANDGAS LAW §, 650-650.4 (abr. ed.,
1993). See also JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAWN ANUTSHELL 274-76 (3d ed.1995) (indicating
the wide dispersion of judgments applied by the courts of various jurisdictions in
distinguishing between production costs and post-production costs). See generally Maria J.
Williams et al., Determining the Lessor's Royalty Share of Post ProductionCosts: Is the Implied
Covenant to Market the Appropriate Analytical Framework ? 41 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L INST. 12-1

(1995).
7. While the value added from post-production marketing is the central focus of this
article, the ownership issues raised affect with equal force all forms of post-production value
added in natural-gas sales.
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article offers a reinterpretation of the basis of royalty ownership in value
added and the necessary acts of exchange by which ownership of such
value is secured.
II. EXCHANGE AS THE REQUISITE BASIS OF OWNERSHIP OF
VALUE ADDED
A. Origin and Basis of Legitimate Ownership Claims
Ownership embraces a trinity of rights that Professor Richard
Epstein describes as a unity; this unity includes the rights of possession, use,
and disposition Professor Epstein invokes the name of John Locke in
advancing the point that "commands of the state" are never a means by
which ownership rights are established. Richard Epstein, Murray Rothbard,
and others have examined the various ways in which individuals establish
legitimate ownership claims in property Murray Rothbard has expanded
upon Locke's theory of property by presenting the logical progression of
actions that secure rightful ownership."0 First, the individual owns himself
and, hence, the product of his own efforts. Second, the individual may
become a legitimate owner of property through a voluntary gift or grant
from another party. Third, the individual may, by appropriating hitherto
an unused and unowned resource and through application of his own labor
in the use of the unclaimed resource, rightfully claim ownership; this latter
means to ownership would be the right of first possession discussed by
Epstein." Fourth, with the resources that he owns, the individual may
acquire ownership by creating or manufacturing goods that have value in

8. Richard Epstein is a professor of law at the University of Chicago. See RICHARD A.
EpsTEiN, TAMcNGS: PRIVATE PROPETY AND ThE POWER O EMINENT DOMAIN 61(1985). Epstein's
remarks on ownership were raised in the context of public takings of private property for
public use. In his book, Epstein offers a thoughtful examination of ways in which the private
rights of property are breached through regulatory edicts without due compensation to the
owner. His central point is that such actions by public entities are violations of Fifth

Amendment protections. The Fifth Amendment states, "nor shall private property be taken for
public use without just compensation."
9. EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 61; MURRAY ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY AND STATE: A
TREATISE ON ECONOMIC PRINCiPLEs 78-70 (1970). See also HANS-HERMANN HOPPE, ECONOMICS
AND ETHICS OF PRIVATE PROPERTY 195-208 (1993); ISRAEL KwRNE, PERCEPTION, OPPORTUNrrY
AND PROFIT 185-99 (1985).
10. ROTHBARD, supra note 9, at 78-79.
11. See EpEsupra note S, at 61. Epstein notes that "[plossession does not come without
an expenditure of resources, and their expenditure makes dear the exclusivity of ownership."
Id. The phrase "expenditure of resources" as used by Epstein seems to imply, exclusive of
ownership of self, that ownership ultimately devolves from some act of exchange. He makes
clear that the phrase "expenditure of resources" has a broader meaning than the mere outlay
of money.
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use or value in exchange. Finally, the individual may acquire legitimate
ownership through the process of voluntary exchange with another party.
Excluding consideration of acquiring ownership through gifts or
grants, the logical inference to be drawn from this listing is that in modem
commercial society, ownership of any valued object is established by an
implicit or explicit act of voluntary exchange that can take one of two forms.
First, ownership can be acquired by an act in which one commits one's own
resources to the creation, manufacture, or production of the object sought;
these actions represent a type of exchange. Second, ownership can be
established by a market transaction in which consideration found to be
mutually agreeable to both parties (monetary payment, barter exchange, or
service) is paid in exchange for the object that one seeks to acquire. As the
following discussion will emphasize, ownership of all value added must
always emanate from either of these acts of exchange. This simple but
universal principle of ownership has direct relevance in defining royaltybearing proceeds in the sale of natural gas and in examining the
controversial feature of gas royalty law that mandates a royalty claim to
value added when no such ownership claim has been legitimately
established or created.
B. Exchange and Ownership in the Context of Natural-Gas Royalties
As the preceding discussion suggests, the ownership of gas-sales
proceeds requires a sharp distinction between the value of two products:
first, the market value of the produced natural gas itself and, second, the
value that is added to the recovered gas subsequent to what is defined as
"production."" Since the latter component of proceeds is the object of
contention, the focus of the article is largely on the latter-value added
viewed as a separate and distinct product and the means by which royalty
owners properly acquire ownership rights in this latter product. As the
following discussion will argue, the acquisition of ownership of postproduction value added should be predicated on deductions for postproduction costs incurred or an actual sharing of such costs incurred prior
to the sale of the natural gas.' 3

12. The issue of how gas production is defined is addressed infra Part IV, A.
13. Deductions for the lessee's post-production cost, or the sharing by the lessor of such
costs, presumes the ability to objectively measure a monetary sum discoverable through an
audit procedure, an accounting tabulation of objectively countable expenses. However, such
an accounting will almost always deviate from actual "opportunity cost" in the lessee's postproduction decisions. Nonetheless, the deduction or sharing of post-productioncost will and must be
based on a percentageshareof this accounting tabulation.As Ronald Coase, University of Chicago
faculty member and Nobel laureate, notes, "costs are not necessarily the same as payments. It
is this fact that makes the 'costs' disclosed by cost accountants something quite different from
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This article also highlights a sharp contrast between value added
and post-production costs. In discussions of royalty-valuation issues, these
items (value added and post-production costs) are frequently treated as
though they are one and the same or that they are somehow identical. These
assumptions are misleading and misrepresent the nature of economic
exchange in the production and marketing of any product. Value added
and post-production costs represent opposite sides of exchanges
undertaken after production. As viewed generically, the acts required in
production of value added are in themselves acts of exchange." The
opportunity costs of inputs required to produce the gas represent what the
lessee exchanges to obtain the produced natural gas. Similarly, postproduction costs represent the acts of exchange undertaken by the lessee to
obtain the post-production value added reflected in higher post-production
prices for the gas. The post-production costs are necessary in creating the
value added but may always differ from the market value added to the
natural gas by incurring these costs. For example, the actual rate of return
to the lessee from the marketing effort, as would be reflected in value
added, could always differ from the rate of return (estimated opportunity

'opportunity cost."' Coase, supranote 4, at 108. Coase goes on to note,
When the satisfaction of a particular contract involves payments and
receipts which extend over a period of time, the businessman's attitude
to risk taking, which as I have said, is purely subjective, will be an
important factor determining the decision actually taken. Since no
method of accounting can reproduce on paper the mental processes of a
businessman, the decision to be taken is one in which no mechanical
process of accounting can disclose.
Id. at 107. In other words, opportunity cost refers to the lessee's valuation of what is
relinquished in committing resources to particular marketing efforts under conditions of
market uncertainty. For example, the cost associated with depreciation is asubjective judgment
reflecting the decision maker's conjecture of the extent to which the value of capital equipment
has been reduced through productive use. This judgment regarding the reduction in value
from use may differ significantly from the amortization contrived through an accounting rule.
See also JAMES M. BUCHANAN, COST AND CHOICE: AN INQUIRY IN ECONOMIC THEORY 49-50

(1969); James Buchanan, Introduction:L.S.E. cost theory in retrospect, in L.S.E. ESSAYS ON COST,
supra note 4, at 1-16. See generally R. S. Edwards, The Rationale of Cost Accounting, in LS.E.
ESSAYS ON COST, supraat 72; Jack Wiseman, The Theory of Public Utility Price-An Empty Box, in
L.S.E. ESSAYS ON COST, supra at 245; G.F. Thirlby, Economist's Cost Rules, in L.S.E. ESSAYS ON
COST, supraat 273.
14. ROThBARD, supra note 9, at 294-97. Rothbard is, of course, not directly addressing the
issue of value added in the marketing of natural gas. His central point is that in any act in
which productive factor services are employed to manufacture a good, the actor has, in effect,
exchanged factor payments for property rights in the good being produced.
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cost on marketing investments) imputed to the resources committed to
post-production marketing."5
In his book Oil and Gas Law, John S. Lowe makes reference to what
essentially constitutes the requisite act of exchange necessary to arrive at
royalty value. "Where royalty is based on an actual sales price.. .and
production is sold downstream, both economic logic and fairness demand
that costs incurred after production be deducted in determining the royalty
basis."' 6 Although the statement by Lowe is absolutely correct, his
observation is not equivalent to a commonly heard declaration that "postproduction cost must be deducted to net out value added and arrive at
value at the wellhead." 7 In principle, gas cannot be valued at the wellhead
unless it is literally sold at the wellhead; the granting of deductions for postproduction costs incurred downstream of the wellhead does not change this
fact. But the deduction does permit one to calculate the "appropriate royalty
basis," as Lowe indicates. As noted above, "post-production costs" and
"value added" are two distinct economic concepts and represent opposite
sides of acts of exchange. When gas is sold downstream of the wellhead,
both the lessee and the lessor know that the royalty will implicitly include
an element of value added. The sharingofpost-productioncosts or thegranting
of deductions for costs does not eliminate the inclusion of value added in the
"appropriategas-royalty basis;" it only establishes the basis for a legitimate
ownershipclaimfor the royalty owner. In other words, prior to the granting of
deductions for post-production costs, the lessor has no legitimate
ownership in downstream value added even though the royalty will be
applied to proceeds that include value added. The central point is that
15. As a practical matter, economic competition will mean that value added and postproduction costs will tend tobe somewhat aligned. A positive difference between value added
and post-production costs would be a "profit" and a negative difference would be a "loss"
from the perspective of the lessee. On the value added side, significant increments in sales
value achieved by post-production marketing investments willbe kept in check by the fact that
lessees are competing in their gas sales with other sellers of gas. Only occasionally will the
lessee be able to sell gas at a price that yields a significant profit above what competitors
obtain. These competitive pressures will mean that any major profits enjoyed by the lessee over
and above a normal rate of return will tend to be diminished. On the post-production-cost side,
competition in the market for the resources required in marketing will mean that the lessee will
be the beneficiary of no sustainable windfall in employing these resources. Hence, any
substantial differentials between value added from marketing and the costs incurred to market
will be temporary. However, at no instance in time should one ever expect them to be identical. See
VON MISES, supranote 1,at 293.
16. LowE, supra note 6, at 273.
17. The issue of what constitutes "value added" cannot be settled in the absence of a clear
definition of "production." This issue is explored at greater length in infra, Part IV, A. The
value added is defined as the increment in the market value of the gas achieved by incurring
post-production costs. But, again, a definition of "post-production costs" requires a legitimate
definition of "production."
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deductions for post-production costs never actually remove value added
from processing, transportation, or marketing. The lessor must always pay
for this royalty share of proceeds by making deductions from the
accounting tabulations of costs incurred by the lessee in creating any postproduction value added; the royalty owner's share of downstream or postproduction value added is, in effect, "purchased" through an explicit act of
exchange. 8 This interpretation of the deductions differs from that presented
by some other writers. The approach offered here, however, is
representative of the underlying economics and the fact that adding value
to the already-produced gas represents a form of production, whether
achieved by processing, transportation, or marketing. As a form of
production, the value added requires productive inputs, which, in turn,
involve costs. The bearing of the costs determines ownershipand the sharingof
the costs represents the act of exchange that establishesshared ownership.
The fact that some post-production costs are clearly deductible and
have never been matters of dispute is at least an implicit acknowledgement
that an act of exchange is required to establish an ownership share in postproduction value added. For example, costs that fall into the categories of
being gas transportation or gas processing are easily identified as being
deductible when the sales price of the gas reflects the enhancement in
market value resulting from the provision of these services." These
deductions are necessary principally because there is a nearly universal
recognition that transportation and processing actually add value to the
already-produced gas and that the lessee has born the attendant costs."
Grantingdeductionsfor these costs is, in effect, an explicit act of exchangefor the
post-production value that is added by transportationand processing. In the
absence of an explicit or implicit act of exchange, the lessor would have
done nothing to establish ownership claims to the value added that is
reflected in the sales price of the gas. The logic and fairness of deducting

18.

This assertion is the central point advanced in this article; it is not settled law. A

contrary interpretation would ignore the means by which legitimate ownership is established.
The issue that this article raises, however, does not extend to those situations in which the nondeductibility of marketing costs is part of an explicit contractualagreement between the lessee

and the royalty owner.
19. See George Siefkin, Rights of Lessor and Lessee with Respect to Sale of Gas and as to Gas
Royalty Provisions,4 INST. ON OIL & GAS L.& TAX'N 181,199-201 (1953).
20. The author uses the phrase "nearly universal recognition" not to suggest that any
contrary view has been found in the relevant literature. No such contrary viewpoint has been
found. The interpretation given here regarding the deductibility of transportation and
processing costs is certainly consistent with that found in WILLUAS &MEYERS,supra note 6,%
650-650.4. Lowe makes the following point: "The rationale usually stated for permitting
deductions is that because the lessor [as royalty owner] becomes entitled to the royalty when
the gas is produced at the wellhead, the lessor should share ratably in costs incurred after
production." LowE, supra note 6, at 273.
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these costs to arrive at a legitimate royalty value have never been
questioned. However, other post-production value added associated with
the "marketing of gas" has come to be treated in a much more illogical
manner. The claim that the non-deductibility of marketing costs arises from
an implicit obligation under the lease seems to be contradictory or
inconsistent with the way in which legitimate ownership claims come into
being, i.e., the bearing of opportunity costs associated with explicit acts of
manufacture or purchase.2
III. THE IMPLIED COVENANT TO MARKET
A. The Implied Covenants and the Original Mandate of Expedited
Marketing
The marketing covenant is only one of several implied covenants
viewed as being implicit in oil and gas leases. The implied covenants were
originally and historically intended to clarify the rights and obligations of
lessees and lessors. These covenants have also been described as "unwritten
promises that generally impose burdens on lessees and protect lessors." The
implied covenants commit lessees to the following implicit managerial
mandates: (1) expeditiously explore the lease, 22 (2) with "due diligence"
conduct development of the lease acreage, (3) protect the lease property
from drainage through the activities of lessees operating on neighboring
tracts, (4) conduct operations in a prudent and diligent manner, and (5)
expeditiously market the oil and gas.
The implied covenants have been "fashioned by the courts
to... .determine what the lessee is required to do for the mutual benefit of
itself and its lessor."' While the phrase "mutual benefit" frequently appears

21. One of the major reasons for the differentiated treatment of marketing costs is
attributable, in major part, to the implied covenant to market, or rather, to an interpretation of
this covenant. This interpretation of the covenant is the principal reason that the ownership of
value added has become surprisingly murky and confused from a judicial perspective. The
implied covenant to market as it applies to gas royalties is addressed at greater length below.
At this point, it may be useful to re-emphasize that the criticism raised in this article is not
directed at those situations in which the non-deductibility of marketing costs arises from an
explicit contractual agreement between the lessee and the royalty owner. The focus is on the
modern-day interpretationof the implied covenant to market in which the lessee is implicitly obligated
to market the gas at no cost to the lessor or royalty owner. The general logic outlined in this article,
however, applies to all post-productionvalue added.
22. One adaptation that has mitigated some of the counterproductive features of this
covenant is a clause in the lease agreement that provides for the payment of rentals to delay
drilling.
23. Judith M. Matlock, Payment of Gas Royalties in Affiliate Transactions,48 INST. ONOIL&
GAS L. & TAX'N 9-1, 9-10 (1997).
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in descriptions of the covenants, in fact, the lessee and the lessor are made
economic adversaries with mutually opposing interests. The "excessive
investment" mandated by the implied covenants is only part of the
problem.2 Of at least equal importance is the fact that the covenants sharply
curtail the property rights of the lessee in dealing with the uncertainty of
changing markets and in deciding on the appropriate time to explore,
develop, produce, and market the gas resource.' Depending upon market
expectations, these decisions would frequently necessitate deliberate delays.
Yet the implied covenants, including the edict of expeditious marketing,
condemn this essential and important activity as "speculation" or evidence
of "incompetence." Nonetheless, timing decisions that may involve delays
are critical in the lessee's ability to efficiently manage the lease and to
achieve economic conservation of the gas resource (as distinct from physical
conservation). But delay is always inimical to the lessor's interests as a
holder of an investment asset.2' The lessor has the opportunity to earn a
higher rate of return by quickly recovering funds from royalties receivable
and immediately investing in assets that earn a higher, competitive rate of

24. Lowe notes the observations of Professor Patrick H. Martin, who argues, "the law of
the implied covenants has ill served the nation because it has resulted in more development
than is economically necessary...." LOWF, supra note 6, at 336.
25. In aiming toward these objectives, the lessee is principally concerned with the goal of
enhancing the net present value (capital value) of the lease. These timing decisions are the means
by which economic conservation of the resource and efficient management of the lease are
achieved. See John Bitland, Human Action and Socially OptimalConservation:A Misesian Inquiry
into the Hotelling Principle,3 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF AUSTJAN ECONOICS 3, 10 (2000).
While not focusing on the implied covenants, Professor Stephen McDonald observes the
following: "the optimum time-distribution of production is defined for one point in time only.
It changes as its determinants change from point to point in time. In particular, it changes with
every change in current and expected costs and prices....Thus continuqusly maximizing net
present value (continuously conserving) requiresflexible adjustments in the time-distribution of
production as the economic values reflecting sacrifice and gain of satisfaction (costs and prices)
change over time."STPHENMcDONALDPETROLEUMCONSERVAT[ONINTHEUNrIEDSTATES:AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 83,84 (1971) (emphasis added).
26. As with any investor, the lessor seeks the highest rate of return obtainable from
alternative investments. Expedited revenue recovery is always optimal for the lessor since
royalties receivable, as investment assets, generally cannot appreciate in value at a rate equal
to the rate of return on alternative investments. The lessor's interests are based on the gross
value of the lease, since his flow of revenue is based on gross market values, whereas the
lessee's interests are based on the lease's net present value. The gross value of the lease may
be static or declining while the net value may be appreciating. In any case, the lessor always
has a vested interest in immediate recovery of the natural gas. But if the rate of appreciation
of the net value of the lease exceeds the highest alternative rate of return obtainable by the
lessee on alternative investments, delay is most efficient from an economic perspective. Hence,
the lessor and the lessee have diametrically opposite incentives in terms of lease management.
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return. ' Protected by the covenants, the lessor has little vested economic
interest in the efficient management of the lease as a capital asset.' These
latter concerns were probably not well understood or acknowledged during
the periods in which the implied covenants eventually became part of
royalty law. Hence, one must assume that in their original intent, the
covenants were never fashioned to be punitive in a way that would
deliberately violate the ownership interests of the lessee. But with respect
to more modem day interpretations of the implied covenant to market, an
implicit respect for ownership claims appears to be much less clear.
As it emerged from early court decisions, the implied covenant to
market seemed to raise no major concerns that bore on property rights. The
initial ruling by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court bore on the responsibility
of the lessee to develop the gas property. The operative language stated that
even in the absence of an explicit development clause, "[tihere would of
course have arisen an implication that the property should be reasonably
developed. " " An 1899 decision offered by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
ruled for the lessor-plaintiff in a suit brought against a lessee to recover
annual royalty payments due on each well "in sufficient quantities to justify
marketing the same."" The court instructed the jury that if the gas were
produced in paying quantities, the lessee would be obligated to market the
gas or provide reason for a failure to do so.31 But the court also stipulated
that the lessee was not compelled to market at a loss but only at a
"reasonable profit" with the latter being determined by consideration of
distance to market and costs of marketing the gas.32 The court concluded
that once a well was producing gas, the lessee was required to continue

27. It should be noted that the lessor's quest for the highest rate of return cannot be
successful unless the lessee is denied flexibility or latitude in making timing decisions on the
lease.
28. The management of the lease as a capital asset necessitates the timing of lease activities
so that present value of economic rent is maximized. Achieving this goal is the essence of the
economic conservation of the resource, but, in fact, the implied covenants have the effect of
dissipating economic rent. Economic rent is dissipated as the covenants impose exploration,
development, and production decisions that can be wasteful from the perspective of "economic

conservation." The implied covenants impose very real costs on lessees by compelling
exploration, development, and production on expedited schedules that may be inconsistent
with the efficient management of leases. In this very real sense, covenants have made the lessor
and lessees economic adversaries because what is beneficial to one party is detrimental to the
interests of the other. By not allowing some latitude in the commencement of these activities,
the covenants are reducing the net present value of natural-gas resources.

29. Williams et al, supranote 6, at 12-1, 12-10 (1995) (quoting Stoddard v. Emory, 18 A.
339, 442 (Pa. 1889)).
30. Iams v. Carnegie Natural Gas Co., 45 A. 54, 54 (Pa. 1899), quoted in Williams et al.,
supranote 6, at 12-10 to 12-11.
31. Id. at 55.
32. Id. at 54.
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production and sale of the gas for the common benefit of both the lessor and
lessee." In brief, the implied covenant to market emerging from these early
court decisions focused exclusively on the lessee's responsibility to search
diligently for a market so that the provisions of the lease are realized.
The essence of the original implied covenant to market has been
described in the following way: "[It] imposes upon the lessee the duty to
use due diligence to market oil and gas produced within a reasonable time
and at a reasonable price. The reasonable prudent operator is a
businessperson, and will seek to maximize profit. The implied covenant to
market requires the lessee to use the diligence of a prudent businessperson
in finding a market and negotiating a sale. " ' 4 On the early history of the
implied covenant to market, Judith Matlock, has noted the following:
[Tihe implied covenant to market evolved from the common
practice of lessors to allow the marketing arrangements to be
made by the lessee. In the early days of the industry, there
were often limited markets for production from a lease and
often all of the production was going to the same market
anyway. This was particularly true for gas production since,
until recently, regulated interstate and intrastate pipelines
were generally the sole purchasers of wellhead production
and, because of their respective regulated monopoly status,
there would usually be only one pipeline in the field or area.
It made no sense for both the lessee and the royalty owner to
contact the pipeline in the field about a well connect; it made
sense for the lessee to do that for both itself and the royalty
owner. However, the end result for the royalty was the same
as if the royalty owner had taken its production in kind.'
The implicit rights and obligations under the original implied
covenant to market did not mandate, in any way, the collection of the
royalty on post-production value added in the absence of an explicit act of
exchange such as the granting of deductions for post-production costs.
Certainly, under terms of an explicit lease agreement between the lessee
and the lessor, the gas can be legitimately valued for royalty purposes
inclusive of any form of value added. The value of the gas beyond the
wellhead could include value added from marketing or even transportation
or processing. Such voluntary agreements, however, would presumably
always include a mutually agreeable economic exchange of consideration
between the lessor and the lessee. In the absence of such an act of exchange,

33. Id.at 55.
34. LOWE supranote 6,at 327-28.
35. Judith M. Matlock, The "Duty to Market" Downstreamat No Cost to the Lessor (The
Alleged Federal"Duty to Market"), in II FED. &INDIAN OIL&GAS ROYALTY VALUATION& MCMT.
2A, 2A-5 (Rocky Mtn.Mim L. Found. 2000).
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payment of royalties on post-production value added would not be logical orfair
from the lessee's point of view.' These possible forms of exchange are
discussed further below.
B. The "New" Interpretation of the Covenant and Its Breach of
Ownership
The implied covenant to market has prompted litigation over a
variety of issues bearing on the marketing of gas. For example, lessors have
taken lessees to court over the price received in the sale of the gas and
allegations that the lessee has failed to obtain the highest price available on
the market. During the 1980s, lawsuits were initiated over the lessee's
shutting in of wells because of inordinately low market prices.' But the
most contentious feature of the implied marketing covenant is the
interpretation mandating that the lessee bears all costs associated with gas
marketing in arriving at royalty bearing proceeds. The cost of marketing
would include the expense associated with placing the gas in "marketable
condition." Marketable condition, as the term applies to gas transactions,
has been defined as lease products that are sufficiently free of impurities
and otherwise in a condition that the products will be accepted by a
purchaser under a sales contract typical for the field or area.' A part of the
problem is that the term "marketable condition" has no universally
accepted definition. In some instances it is treated as a market norm and at
other times as an explicit engineering mandate. This mandate includes
several procedures, all of which add value to the produced gas and are said to
be necessary to place a lease product in "marketable condition." The
mandate could include the requirement that the lessee bear the following
categories of cost: (1)measuring (placing gas in a calibrated chamber under
standard pressure to establish volume), (2) gathering (transporting gas
through small pipelines from individual wells to some central facility), (3)
compressing (the use of compressors to move gas through pipeline systems
to a centrally located facility such as a main pipeline or processing station),
(4) sweetening (removal of sulfur), and (5) dehydrating (removal of water
vapors from the natural gas). Under the contemporary interpretation of the
marketing covenant, the value added to the natural gas from these
procedures would be royalty bearing, without deductions for the respective
post-production costs. In other words, by governmental decree, the lessor is

36. LOWE, supra note 6, at 272-73.
37. Richard G. Morgan& Jeffrey G. Shrader,An Introduction to Royalty Owner and Working
Interest OwnerIssues in the CurrentGas Market, in BUYING ANDSELLING GAS: APRACICALGUIDE
FOR OPERATORS, NON-OPERATORS AND ROYALTY OWNERS 1, 11-13 (Paul Strohl ed., 1990).
38. 30 C.F.R. § 206.171 (1998).
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deemed to be the owner of a property,i.e.,value added, without any act of exchange
to legitimately establish this ownership.
This interpretation of the implied marketing covenant would
ostensibly treat several post-production activities as part of production.
Understandably, this issue has become one of the most contentious issues
facing the gas industry since it directs the lessee to "market gas" at no cost
to the royalty owneror lessor. In today's gas market, this interpretation would
impose a royalty on post-production value that is added through
marketing, meaning that the lessor is accorded a property right in postproduction value added. Part of the problem is that there is an ambiguity
in the way that production is defined. Without a clear definition of
production, one can arrive at no consistent definition of royalty-bearing
proceeds and value added. None of these terms are capable of a precise
clarification without a definition of production that reflects fidelity to the
respective property rights of the lessee and lessor.
The conundrum of the implied covenant to market can be traced to
a critical turn in its interpretation that occurred in 1940. The interpretation
of the implied covenant to market remained as described above until
Professor Merrill invented an interpretation of the covenant to market that
somehow became the authoritative statement on the subject. In a treatise on
covenants implied in oil and gas leases, Merrill offered the following
comment: "If it is the lessee's obligation to market the product, it seems
necessarily to follow that his is the task also to prepare it for market, if it is
un-merchantable in its natural form."39 This observation by itself was not
particularly unreasonable; however, Merrill went on to declare the
following: "No part of the costs of marketing or of preparation for sale is
chargeable to the lessor."' By this interpretation, post-production costs of
marketing the gas are not deductible in establishing royalty value.
Somehow, the courts in several jurisdictions have viewed this perspective
on marketing cost sympathetically. 41 The Merrill interpretation of lessee
marketing responsibility was the genesis of a new implied covenant or duty
to market; it has since been cited as the primary authority on the subject in
legal defenses of the implied covenant to market.

39. MAURicE H. MERRILL, THE LAW RELATING TO COVENANTS IMPUED IN OIL AND GAS
LEASES 214 (2d ed. 1940).
'40. Id. 214-15. At a later point in his treatise, Merrill excluded from marketing cost the

expense of transporting the gas to a distant point of sale. See id. at 219.
41. See, e.g., Garman v. Conoco, Inc., 886 P.2d 652, 659 (Colo. 1994); Stemberger v.
Marathon Oil Co., 894 P.2d 788, 799 (Kan. 1995); Wood v. TXO Prod. Co., 854 P.2d 880,882
(Okla. 1992). The state courts in each of these cases held that the lessee has the implied duty
to place gas in "marketable condition" at no cost to the lessor. A similar ruling was made in
an earlier decision, CalforniaCo. v.Udall, 296 F.2d 384,388 (D.C. Cir.1961).
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Understandably, the Merrill perspective has not met with universal
acceptance principally because it appears to contradict basic principles of
logic and fairness. At the time, Merrill defended his interpretation by saying
that his view was "supported by the general current of authority.' 42 To
Merrill, the "general current of authority" was exemplified by decisions and
legal opinions to which he made reference. Subsequent scholarly
examination of the cases cited by Merrill, however, reveals little to warrant
the characterization of "general current of authority." For example, in a
1972 issue of the Oklahoma Law Review, Richard Altman and Charles
Lindberg stated the following: "we reluctantly, in our opinion, conclude the
cases [Merrill] cites do not support his premise."43 In an earlier scholarly
examination of Merrill's declaration on costs of marketing, George Siefkin,
writing in 1953, observes,
There are, then, almost no decisions that tend to support
Professor Merrill's contention... .Nor does the logic of
Professor Merrill's argument appeal to me... .To my mind it
is equally persuasive to insist that the duty to market is
confined to the product in the state in which it is producedat the
well, and it does not include any duty, at the lessee's sole
expense, to increase its value .... The implied covenant to
"market" undoubtedly includes numerous "at the well"
functions,...necessary to bring the gas out of the hole (to
"produce" it) and render it available for marketing at the
well-to the extent that the gas or oil which comes from the
hole constitutes, in its naturalstate, a marketable product at
that time and place. Conceivably this duty might embrace,
also, such simple on-the premises "processing" as placing oil
in storage tanks and permitting the law of gravity to
withdraw its impurities....But to my mind dehydration, for
example, is as far beyond the boundary of the lessee's
"marketing" duty as transporting gas to a distant purchaser.'

42. MERRILLsupra note 39, at 215. Merrill cites the following cases as the "general current
of authority": Hamilton v. Empire Gas & Fuel Co., 230 P. 91 (Ka. 1924); Warfield Natural Gas Co.

v. Allen, 88 S.W. 989 (Ky. 1935); Clark v. Slick Oil Co., 211 P. 496 (Okla. 1922); Tremont Lumber
Co. v. La. Oil Refining Corp., 175 S. 25 (La. 1937).
43. Richard B. Altman & Charles S. Lindberg, Oil and Gas: Non Operating Oil and Gas
Interests' Liabilityfor Post Production Expenses, 25 OKLA. L REV. 363,370 (1972).
44. Siefkin, supranote 19, at 199,201-02. Siefkin makes reference to a process sometimes
described as "simple separation." The gas resource to be valued does not necessarily emerge
at the wellhead in a "gas form." At the wellhead, the gas resource is frequently part of a
hydrocarbon fluid that includes oil and water in addition to gas. But buyers clearly want the
oil and gas resources separated. Thus, the fluids must be separated into the respective resource
components. It is this procedure that is sometimes referred to as "simple separation." During
simple separation, gravity is used to separate the oil and gas. Oil is heavy compared to gas and,
hence, settles to the bottom of the tank used for the separation procedure. The relatively lighter
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While Merrill's interpretation of the implied covenant to market
may have meant one thing in the year 1940, changes in the gas market raise
the question of how the implied-marketing covenant is to be interpreted in
the year 2001. Concern over the implied covenant to market has been
intensified by recent developments in the gas industry arising from changes
in public regulatory policy toward the gas industry. These policy changes
were prompted by a growing awareness of the economic costs of price
controls and regulation of the gas industry. Legislation by the U.S. Congress
and a succession of de-regulatory measures by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) decontrolled wellhead prices and
established separate pricing of marketing services that were once performed
exclusively on a "bundled basis" by the pipeline companies in their buying
and selling of natural gas.' Whereas pipelines were once individually the
principal prospective purchasers, marketing institutions have since
emerged that offer the producers competitive options in arranging sales
downstream of the lease.
Gas producers have adapted to these changes in regulatory policy
by altering the way in which gas is marketed. First, smaller producers
without affiliated marketing firms have been able to take advantage of
previously nonexistent marketing options to move the point of gas sale
downstream of the wellhead. In these transactions, the gas producers bear
the costs of marketing services, including the costs of finding a purchaser
and negotiating the terms of the sales contracts. As emphasized above,

gas rises to the top of the tank. After a sufficient lapse of time, the separation is complete. The
residual oil is then pumped into storage tanks and the gas is conveyed into a gas gathering
system. See AMERICAN PETROLEUM INsmur, PRIMER OF OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION 33 (1976).

The "raw" gas in the separated state is the resource to which reference is made when using the
term "wellhead condition."
45. ARLONR. TusSING&BOB TIPPEE, THE NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY: EVOLUTION, STRUCTURE
AND ECONOMY 224-27 (1995). See alsoMatlock, supranote 21, §§ 9.01-9.02. The FERC Order 636
was prompted by the Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989. Pub. L No. 101-60, § 1,103
Stat. 157 (1989) (amending scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1994)). In this law,
Congress mandated FERC to improve "the competitive structure of the gas industry so as to
pass the benefits of wellhead price decontrol to the public." TUSSING &TIPPEEsupra,at 224. In
Order 636, FERC sought to equalize the quality and range of transport services available to all
market participants. One of the major means by which FERC sought to accomplish the latter
goal was through the unbundling of all services available to buyers and sellers in the market:
According to the commission, efficiency in the gas market would be realized
only when gas buyers and sellers knew the prices of the distinct elements
associated with the full range of services needed to procure and deliver gas
from the wellhead to the point of final consumption, and were thus able to
mix and match those specific service elements that optimized their respective
welfare. The order was intended to restructure the gas market in a manner
that made the cost of each such service element distinct and transparent.
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these costs, in general, are not deductible in establishing royalty value.
Second, larger gas producers have responded to these policy changes by
marketing gas through newly created affiliated marketers. The transactions
of the gas-marketing affiliates, however, have raised new questions in the
interpretation of the implied covenant to market. Is the royalty to be levied
against the first sale of gas made by the marketing affiliate? Are the costs
borne by the marketing affiliate to be treated as costs of marketing under
the marketing covenant? An answer of "yes" to these questions would
mean that the royalty basis would include value added, no part of which
has been paid for through any act of exchange between the lessor and
lessee; the lessorwould bearno costs that would establishany ownershipin value
added. Hence, many costs associated with storage and aggregation, for
example, would be treated as production costs when clearly they are
nothing of the sort. A logical and fair demarcation must be drawn between
actual production and marketing activities that add value to the gas once
it has left the lease.
IV. OWNERSHIP DEMARCATION BETWEEN PRODUCTION AND
VALUE ADDED
A. The Significance of the "Wellhead" as the Logical Termination of
Production
A logical and fair demarcation between production and the adding
of value rests on a clear understanding of the ownership rights of the
respective parties. In their famous treatise, Williams and Meyers raise the
demarcation issue in the following way:
Royalty clauses.. .typically provide that some share of
production (or of the proceeds or the value thereof) shall be
delivered to the lessor or non-operator "free of the costs of
production...." Implicit in such provisions and definitions is
the assumption that the royalty or other non-operating
interests is or may be subject to certain costs, namely, costs
subsequent to production. There arises then a question
concerning the costs that are to be borne by the operator
alone out of his share of production and the costs that the
royalty owner may be called upon to share. The question can
be posed in a variety of ways, e.g.: (1) when does production
cease and other activities begin? (2) What are the costs of
production as distinguished from costs subsequent to
production? (3) At what place must his share of the oil or gas
46. Infra Part V, Bexplores some of the public policy concerns associated with this royaltycollection practice.
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(or its value or the proceeds thereof) be delivered to the
royalty owner "free of costs". 7
Williams and Meyers emphasize that production generally
terminates at the well and that royalty is payable at the well. They then go
on to list the costs that are shared by the lessee and the royalty owner.
These costs include the following: "gross production and severance taxes;
transportation charges or other expenses incurred in transporting [gas]
from the wellhead to the place where the buyer takes possession; expenses
for treatment required to make [gas] saleable, viz expenses of dehydration;
expenses of compressing gas to make it deliverable into a purchaser's
pipeline; and, manufacturing costs incurred in extracting liquids."" The
wellhead is also the point of demarcation, as stated by Lowe:
The sale of natural gas, in particular may involve substantial
costs after production. Natural gas often cannot be sold at the
wellhead, but must be transported by the lessee to a pipeline
or to an end user. In addition, natural gas may require cleaning, dehydrating, processing or compressing before sale.
Transporting, cleaning, dehydrating, processing and compressing may be very expensive. These processes may also
substantially increase the value of the natural gas. Thus the
sale price downstream must be "worked back" to the
"amount realized" at the well.4
Lowe's basic point can be stated in another way more consistent
with the central theme of this article: the basis for royalty valuation will
reflect the net difference between all post-production value added and all
post-production costs whether these cost arise from processing,
transportation, or marketing. The lessor must pay for his share of the value
added either by the granting of deductions for costs incurred by the lessee
or through an explicit sharing of the costs. In other words, an act of
exchange must establish ownership.
But why should the wellhead be the point of demarcation between
production and the adding of value? What is that bedrock principle that
makes the wellhead the logical and fair point for the valuation of royalties?
In his 1953 paper, Siefkin makes the following observation: "In the absence
of specific phraseology in the lease compelling a contrary conclusion, royalty
with respect to marketed gas is computed and paid on the basis of its market value
at the well....
That is the point at which thegas is 'captured'and title thereto 'vests'
(regardless of the local law regarding title to minerals in place and

47. WILL.A5 & MEYERs, supranote 6,at §§ 650-650.4.
48. Altman & Lindberg, supranote 43, at 366 n.14 (1972).
49. LowE, supra note 6, at 273.
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unaccrued royalty)."' In other words, ownership is established once the gas
is captured and the place at which this occurs is at the wellhead. The
vesting of ownership at the well provides the logical and fair point at which
to conclude production has terminated. All additional activity beyond the
wellhead involves adding value to the already produced gas. As
emphasized throughout this article, the value against which royalties are
collected must reflect the established ownership interests of both the lessor
and lessee. The implication of this demarcation of ownership is that the
lessor has an ownership right to the specified percentage share of
production once ownership comes into being."' Beyond the wellhead and
the separation facilities, gross proceeds are accounted for by the value of the
raw gas plus the gross income accruing to storage, aggregation inputs
necessary for recovery, simple separation, treatment, transportation, and/or
processing. Hence, in the absence of some explicit act of exchange such as
the granting of deductions for costs incurred by the lessee, the latter gross
proceeds (as measured downstream of the wellhead) are more inclusive
than the former since they include income return to resources to which the
lessor has no legitimate property claim.
Nonetheless, as the following discussion will explain, through a
mutual recognition of the legitimate property claims of the respective
parties, the lessor has a means available to establish proper ownership
claims in value added. Clearly a price must be paid for such claims. Several
types of economic exchange could justify a royalty on the gas-sales price
that is the gross of post-production value added; these all involve the lessor
making a commitment of additional resources or explicit sacrifice that
would entitle it to a share of the incremental value added in marketing the
gas. For example, the lease may include a provision by which the lessor
bears a portion of post-production costs of marketing and transportation.
A similar "grossing-out" could be done for any processing of gas prior to
first sale in those clear instances in which the lessor has jointly invested in
any enhancement in the value of the gas. The lessor and the lessee,
however, may well arrive at other mutually agreeable acts of economic
exchange by which the royalty can be attached to a value post-production
of the wellhead. By mutual agreement, the royalty rate may be lowered or
the lease may be issued with a lower bonus in exchange for the lessee's
payment of royalties on a gas value inclusive of value added postproduction of the wellhead. But in the absence of any such acts of exchange,

50. Siefkin, supra note 19, at 184 (emphasis added) (citing an extensive list of sources,
omitted herein, and noting that many additional authorities are collected within the listed
citations).
51. Altman and Lindberg draw parallel conclusions in their 1972 paper. See Altman &
Lindberg, supra note 43, at 366.
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no logical or fair means exist by which a royalty on value added can be
levied. In the post-production phase downstream of the wellhead, all of the
incremental royalty income collected by the lessor would properly accrue
to the owner(s) of inputs and productive services to which the lessor has no
property rights. This rule applies whether or not the resource is a very high
quality gas with high market value or a low quality resource with low
market value.
B. Conflict between the "New" Covenant and Legitimate Ownership: A
Summary
As noted above, the original "implied covenants of gas royalty law"
were intended only to clarify the rights and obligations of lessees and
lessors. Historically, the implied covenant to market held the lessee to a
"prudent operator standard" in which the lessee was obligated to operate
in a manner consistent with the common good of both the lessor and the
lessee. When viewed as a "standard of prudent operation," the implied
covenant to market is, in essence, a criterion of performance aimed at
assuring responsible management of the lease and the marketing of the gas.
"[Ilt is simply a duty to market gas (or oil) when a reasonable and diligent
operator would do so, and in the manner such as an operator would
employ."' The early interpretation of the implied covenant to market
implicitly embraced a logic that was at least not grossly inconsistent with
the institution of secure ownership rights.
The contemporary variant of the implied duty to market is not only
inappropriate in today's gas market but has never represented coherent or
equitable royalty law. The central issue revolves around court-mandated
requirements that ignore the structure of property rights implicit in the
lessor-lessee relationship. The enforcement of the modem interpretation of
the implied covenant to market accords the lessor a share of the value
added that is, according to the principle enunciated by Epstein, entirely the
property of the lessee. Those claiming that the implied covenant to market
mandates royalty valuation inclusive of post-production value added are
obliged to buttress their claim with explanation of the attendant property
claims supporting such a requirement.' Unless the royalty owner shares the
post-production cost associated with marketing the gas, he has engaged in
no act of exchange to establish additional royalty ownership or equity

52. Siefkin, supra note 19, at 183.
53. Williams et. al.,
supra note 6, at 12.02(1). The authors note that "except in those
situations where specific lease language has been employed to move the point of royalty
valuation downstream, the lessor's equity [ownership] has been generally understood to attach
to the produced mineral at the wellhead in its natural state."

Summer 20011

VALUE ADDED IN NATURAL-GAS SALES

interest in value added beyond the point of production-the wellhead.
Legitimate ownership claims mandate that the royalty must be charged
against a value in which the royalty owner is a partial owner. It is this
principle of ownership that is notably absent from the modem version of
the implied covenant to market as enunciated by Merrill.
V. AVOIDANCE OF ECONOMIC WASTE AND INEFFICIENCY
THROUGH THE REQUISITE ACTS OF EXCHANGE
While the preceding discussion acknowledges that the lessor has no
ownership claim to economic rent, the subject of rent cannot be ignored in
addressing the way in which the royalty basis affects the management of
leases. As noted above, the two principle functions of royalties are to share
risk between the lessor and the lessee and to capture economic rent.
Economic rent has been described as a surplus arising from the fact that for
particular reservoirs or fields, the natural-gas price is significantly above all
opportunity costs associated with gas production, bearing in mind that this
difference between price and cost is dependent upon the lessee's timing of
operations on the lease. An important and critical implication of the
definition of economic rent is that, in principle, the economic rent can be
appropriated or collected through a tax or royalty without affecting lessees'
decision making with respect to the exploration, development, and
production of the resource.' Efforts to capture more than economic rent
through royalties would distort and, in some cases, abort efficient resourcemanagement decisions. The contemporary interpretation of the implied
covenant to market represents one such effort. The extent of economic rent
defines the practical limits of what the lessor can successfully collect
through gas royalties without affecting the lessee's management of the
resource.' But the implied covenant to market relieves the lessor of the
obligation to pay for post-production value added through deductions for
post-production cost or an explicit sharing of such costs. This failure of
exchange means that the "effective royalty percentage rate at the wellhead"
borne by the lessee is higher than the rate that would be sustained by the
lessee in a royalty collected on the appropriate royalty basis. It necessarily
means that, at the economic margin, some undeveloped discoveries will not

54. ROSS GARNAUT & ANTHONY CLUNIES ROSS, TAXATION OF MINERAL RENTS 17,20-21
(1983). It is important to reemphasize the fact that royalties cannot, in actual practice, be

applied in a manner that does not negatively affect incentives to efficiently manage the gas
resource. The remainder of the discussion highlights this fact.
55.

ld. at 31.
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be developed and some already-developed projects will yield lower returns
to lessees; economic efficiency and economic benefits are sacrificed.'
A. Ways in which the Marketing Covenant Further Distorts Conservation
Decisions
A so called perfect royalty would collect only economic rent-no
more, no less; it would allow the lessor to capture economic rent without
adversely affecting decision making with respect to management or
conservation of the gas resource. 7 Such a royalty would be essentially
neutral in its consequences. As implemented under the implied covenant
to market, however, the royalty owner acquires property without having
to pay for the right of ownership; royalties on the lessee's value added
impose negative incentives that adversely affect economic conservation of
the resource in several interrelated ways. First, use of the implied covenant
to market to collect royalties on value added aggravates a negative impact
of the incentives required for efficient exploration of gas resources. But the
implied covenant to market makes this negative impact more severe than
would be the case with a royalty properly collected at the wellhead.
McDonald offers the following observations on the effects of royalties on
the incentive to explore:
It is at once apparent that the higher a royalty rate is, the
more likely it will result in some discoveries not being

56. In practice, fixed-rate royalties would tend to recover more revenue than would be
represented by "economic rent" were it not for the fact that lessees shut-in or discontinue
operations earlier than would otherwise be the case, i.e., early abandonment. This fact applies
even in those instances in which there is no effort made to collect a royalty on post-production
value added from marketing investment by the lessee. No post-production value added,
whether created from transportation, processing, or marketing, is part of economic rent. All
post-production value added can be created only by the lessee's investments. Any royalty on
post-production value added will function as a tax on the lessee and tends to penalize the
lessee in considering the recovery of extra cubic feet of natural gas. The net value to the lessee
of recovering the marginal cubic volume is diminished or eliminated, which means that more
gas remains unrecovered. But as the following discussion will show, this reduced ultimate
recovery is only one way in which royalties can reduce the efficiency of natural-gas
conservation. Incentives to explore and develop the lease are also adversely affected since the
net incremental value to the lessee of all investment decisions will tend to be depressed. The
contemporary interpretation of the implied covenant to market tends to intensify the
inefficiency associated with fixed royalty rates since it raises the effective royalty rate as measured
at the wellhead. See Gaffney, supra note 3, at 4; STEPHEN McDONALD, THE LEASING OF FEDERAL
LANDs FOR FOSSIL FUELS PRODUCTION 100 (1979) [hereinafter LEASiNG OF FEDERAL LANDSJ;
GARNAUT & Ross, supranote 54, at 22-28.
57. See GARNAUT & Ross, supranote 54, at 22. These authors are using the term "tax" as
the fiscal tool to capture mineral rents. However, their use of the term "tax" is equivalent to
the term "perfect royalty" as used in this sentence.
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developed and in the early abandonment of all. This is
because a royalty represents a negative cash flow in the
evaluation of expected proceeds from development and
production. The higher the royalty rate, the lower is the
present value of expected net cash flow, ceteris paribus; thus
the fewer discoveries that can be economically developed,
and the less complete the exhaustion of deposits when
economical production can no longer be sustained.'
To repeat the point, the imposition of an additional royalty on value
added from marketing investments raises the effective percentage rate 'of
the royalty at the wellhead. The negative effect on incentives to explore and
develop that would normally be associated with any royalty are further
intensified by the .fact that the lessor does not have to exchange a
proportionate share of post-production costs for a share of post-production
value added.
Second, in general, the imposition of the royalty on the lessee's
value added has the undesirable effect of decreasing total ultimate gas
recovery below what it would have been in the absence of the royalty.
Moreover, less ultimate recovery in the aggregate means that the market
price of the gas resource is increased beyond what would be the case in the
absence of royalties on value added. As McDonald notes,
If the royalty rate is fixed, regardless of the cost of minerals
production in relation to price, then the royalty affects the
margin of land use for minerals extraction and also, to a
degree, the price of extracted minerals.. .a fixed royalty as a
contractual rent form generally does not coincide precisely
with pure economic rent. It is the nature of the contract, not
the nature of economic rent, that causes the rent payment to
affect price...[T]otal mineral production.. .and [its] present
value.. .are both reduced by the contractual provision for a
royalty."
It necessarily follows that an additional royalty on value added
results in an additional economic waste in the recovery of the natural gas.
The loss of ultimate gas recovery that arises from the royalty itself is further
aggravated by the fact that the lessor does not have to exchange a
proportionate share of post-production costs for a share of post-production
value added. Hence, royalty collection on post-production value added
becomes a tax on additional recovery of natural gas.
Third, the royalty on value added from marketing reduces the
present value of the gas reservoir to the lessee; this reduction in the value

58.
59.

LEASINGOF FEDERAL LANDS, supra note 56, at 100.
Id. at 36-38.
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of the reservoir means that the level of investment in the project is also
reduced.' The incentive to invest in additional productive capacity in
natural gas recovery rests on the prospect of shifting revenues that would
accrue in later years to earlier years. In making these investment decisions,
the lessee must balance the benefit of earlier revenue recovery with the
additional investment outlay that must be undertaken to obtain revenues
sooner. The royalty of post-production value added depresses the value of
the net-revenue stream that can be recovered by the lessee and that, in turn,
means that there is less net benefit to the lessee from additional investment.
Less productive capacity means that the scale of recovery operations is
reduced. A smaller scale of operations means that the additional
incremental cost of recovering additional volumes of natural gas will be
higher than would otherwise be the case. In recovery operations, the lessee
eventually reaches a point at which there is no additional net benefit to
recovering additional volumes of natural gas. Itnecessarily follows that this
point is reached earlier with royalties on post-production value added.
Hence, beyond the effect of the legitimate royalty itself, the introduction of
a royalty on value added from marketing would induce operators to invest
less and to waste some of the gas resource that would otherwise be
recovered. A related concern is the fact that royalties on value added create
a bias against the development of lower quality gas resources (marginal,
lower quality gas deposits which have been discovered will remain
undeveloped because the royalty collected on value added makes the
expected net present value of projects either negative or too small to
warrant development).
Fourth, royalties on value added tend to distort the timing of all
activities undertaken on the lease. Lessees face a greater incentive to further
delay all activities on the leased land including exploration, development,
and production. In the absence of anticipated royalties on value added,
lessees would undertake these activities sooner. Also, as noted above,
royalties tend to create the incentive for the lessee to terminate recovery
sooner than would otherwise be the case. Once production has commenced
on the lease, the lessee (or operator) tends to treat the royalty on value
added as another component of cost. Hence, abandonment occurs even
earlier than would be the case in the absence of anticipated royalty
payments on income to which the lessor has established no legitimate
ownership claims. These negative consequences could be avoided if the
60. Id.at 38. McDonald notes the following: "ilt
is likely that the introduction of a royalty
would induce operators to install less capacity. (With a royalty to pay, less transfer of cash flow
from future to present can be accomplished by a given increment to capacity; hence the less
profitable an increment would be.).. .[Thepresent value of rent receipts would be reduced
and, depending upon the effect of capacity on marginal extraction costs, ultimate recovery
might also be reduced." Id. at 38 n.2.
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lessor were obligated to exchange the proportionate share of postproduction marketing costs for a share of the post-production value that is
added from the lessee's marketing investments.
B. Avoidance of Further Allocative Waste because of Ownership Breach
Each of the four concerns outlined above represents the market
distortions that would apply to all royalties even if correctly levied against
the sales price net of marketing costs. All of the negative conservation
consequences of royalties, however, are only magnified and aggravated by
royalty collection procedures that tend to include value added that has not
been paid for by marketing-cost deductions or sharing. Valuation
procedures respectful of ownership rights would represent moves toward
minimization of distortions. In practice, respect for ownership rights
necessitates that the resource be valued such that the royalty basis is net of
all post-production costs inclusive of processing, transportation, and
marketing. But again, this stipulation does not mean that value added has
been netted out, since value added and post-production costs are not the
same entity-though they may roughly approximate each other in most
instances.61 Rather, it only means that the appropriate royalty basis may
implicitly but inevitably include some value added but must be net of all
costs incurred beyond the wellhead.62 Hence, distortions normally
associated with gas royalty collection are minimized the more narrowly
focused the definition of royalty-bearing proceeds and the more complete
the granting of deductions for all post-production costs incurred between
the wellhead and the point of actual sale.'
61. The degree of distortion is directly a function of the royalty rate. The effect of the
implied covenant to market is to levy a royalty on value that is inclusive of value added. If one
views the raw gas at the wellhead as the royalty-bearing resource, the contemporary
interpretation of the implied covenant has the effect of imposing an effective royalty rate above
the rate that may be specified in the lease.
62. The deduction of post-production costs may not leave a positive residual of value
added. In some instances the difference between post-production value added and postproduction costs may leave a net loss. However, the nature of this differential would not be
a proper focus of accountants or auditors. As emphasized above, the actual costs incurred by
lessees and providers of post-production services will have strongly subjective dimensions
since all investments and contracts related to processing, transportation, and marketing may
involve significant exposure to market uncertainty. See, e.g., KNIGHT, supra note 1. "These
difficulties centre around the fact that costs and receipts cannot be expressed unambiguously
in money terms since courses of action may have advantages and disadvantages that are not
monetary in character, because of the existence of uncertainty and also because of differences
in the point of time at which payments are made receipts obtained." Coase, supra note 4, at 103.
63. In this discussion, the author is assuming an essential equivalence between the acts
of "making deductions," "granting allowances," and "netting back." For the purpose of this
discussion, these terms can be used interchangeably since they are all designed to achieve the
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The breach of ownership rights inherent in the modem application
of the implied covenant to market has allocative implications that extend
beyond the economic conservation of the resource. The breach of ownership
rights also acts as an impediment to increased efficiency in the marketing
of gas resources. The concept of "efficiency" can be most competently
defined in terms of a paraphrase of the definition of economic conservation
quoted above. As such, efficiency is action designed to achieve the
maximum expected net present value of the resources employed by the
firm. Such actions can be observed in the gas industry's response to the
deregulation that has occurred in recent years. As noted above, the
deregulation of the gas industry has induced several structural changes
designed to increase the efficiency with which gas is marketed. One of these
changes includes the action on the part of some producers to sell or market
gas at locations far removed from the wellhead. For other larger firms, the
means to increased efficiency has been to market gas through marketing
affiliates. The various goals sought in these efficiency enhancing
adaptations may include (1)an effort to increase expected net revenues, (2)
specialization in resource use, (3) reduction in expected transactions cost,
or (4) more efficient management of financial risk." But depending upon
the manner in which the implied marketing covenant is applied, these
marketing adaptations may result in the collection of royalties on additional
post-production value added. The net effect of this breach of ownership
rights is to penalize efforts on the part of lessees to efficiently manage all of
the resources required to move the gas from the reservoir to the ultimate
user. Royalties on post-production value added are an impediment to
increased market efficiency.
VI. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Gas royalties are usually collected as a percentage of gas sales
value. A central question arises, however, in the gas royalty valuation
process: Should the royalty basis against which royalties are charged
include post-production value added from gas marketing in which the
royalty owner has no legitimate property claims? Or should the royalty
owner be obligated to buy the royalty proportion of value added by
granting deductions for post-production marketing costs? Clearly,
same purpose in royalty valuation-the establishment of an appropriate net-royalty-bearing
value.
64. Matlock, supranote 23, at9-3 to 9-4. In this chapter, Judith Matlock makes the case that
one of the principal motivations for the emergence of affiliated marketing firms has been the
need to manage risk more efficiently. She focuses in particular on the need to "isolate
liabilities" in efforts to market gas; the creation of marketing affiliates helps to achieve this
objective..
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individual lessors and lessees can arrive at explicit lease agreements that
provide precise answers to both questions; however, the modem
interpretation of the implied covenant to market answers "yes" to the first
question and, apparently, "no" to the second.
The problem with this interpretation of the implied covenant is that
it is at odds with answers yielded by the established economic institution
of ownership rights. The lessor cannot logically or equitably claim more
than the proportionate royalty share of the gas produced at the wellhead
unless some act of exchange is undertaken. Without the lessor's having
somehow shared in the post-production marketing costs, the lessor cannot
claim any royalty ownership in post-production value added from
marketing efforts.
The contemporary interpretation of the implied duty to market
raises concerns over gas resource conservation. These concerns emanate
from the ownership problems that arise in attaching a royalty to the value
added from placing gas in marketable condition and from marketing the
gas. First, any royalty creates an incentive to recover less of the gas resource
than would otherwise be recovered. But, second, attaching a royalty to postproduction value added only aggravates this problem. A valuable energy
resource is wasted and the economic rent associated with natural-gas
production is dissipated.

